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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The above court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to U.C.A. 78-2a-3. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This matter has been before the Utah State Bar Fee 
Arbitration Committee which awarded cross-complainant $500.00 and 
before this court which vacated a default judgement in favor of 
plaintiff/attorney Miller. Now, the trial court has awarded 
attorney Miller said $500.00 in quantum meruit and rejected cross-
complainant Johnson*s claims. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I 
When does the trial court have authority to reject or ignore 
a ruling of the Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration Committee? 
II 
Can attorney Miller sue for a contingency fee and then 
recover in quantum meruit? 
Ill 
Is cross-complainant entitled to refund of a $500.00 unearned 
retainer, reasonable attorney fees, costs of a prior appeal, and 
punitive damages? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED #78-27-56 
GENERAL RULES OF ETHICS #11 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Michael L. Miller was retained by defendant Gordon 
Johnson in a personal injury action (GORDON E. JOHNSON & VERNA K. 
JOHNSON VS. DAVID K. BUSH. Second District Court of Utah, Civil 
No. 1-37321). Plaintiff agreed to take the case on contingency 
and was paid $500.00 as an advance in the action. Plaintiff 
obtained a settlement offer in the personal injury action for 
$5,000 and submitted it to defendant. When defendant rejected the 
settlement offer, the plaintiff withdrew and immediately sued 
defendant for one-third of the offer, i.e. $1,167 which would 
together with $500.00 advance be 1/3 of the settlement offer which 
was rejected. 
Third district presiding Judge Scott Daniels signed the fee 
arbitration ruling that plaintiff Miller owed the defendant 
$500.00, and that he had not earned any fees because he quit. 
Subsequently, defendant retained attorney Phillip W. Dyer who 
obtained a settlement offer of $6,500 which was accepted and 
netted defendant $5,000. 
Please see the affidavit attached that attorney Miller 
submitted to the fee arbitration committee. There is no mention 
that an attorney employment agreement was mailed and not signed, 
or sufficient justification for him to quit. He had just made 
arrangements for defendant, in the case at bar, to pay for his 
deposition in Brigham City, Utah concerning the personal injury. 
His reasons for withdrawing continually change. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts should not reject or ignore fee arbitration 
rulings; where there is a contingency agreement, recovery in 
quantum meruit is not available, and this action is meritless and 
malicious justifying punitive damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
In Utah it is virtually impossible to hire an attorney to sue 
or defend against another attorney. Therefore, fee arbitration is 
the only practical, economical remedy for a client sued by his 
attorney. Utah fee arbitration includes a non-attorney and is 
fair. 
The first time around Judge Daines rejected the argument that 
the fee arbitration ruling was a sufficient answer. 
Now, Judge Baldwin ignores the ruling of the fee arbitration 
committee which is in accordance with prevailing law. If a trial 
judge does not accept such rulings, he is letting an attorney 
pursue and action "not well grounded in fact and law" under Rule 
11. 
In California an attorney must attack an adverse fee ruling 
and not ignore it and proceed against his former client. See the 
excerpts from the California Business and Professions code on file 
herein, and appellant's first brief in this matter. 
Now, the Utah State Bar won't arbitrate a fee dispute unless 
the attorney agrees to mandatory arbitration. Of course he wonTt. 
Arbitration must be preserved and strengthened! 
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II 
In the reporter's transcript State of Utah vs. Johnson, 
880587-CA, attorney Miller testifies as follows: 
"A - I took it to the point where they had 
made an offer of settlement, and withdrew at 
that point, and thenV^accepted the offer of 
settlement after I withdrew." (Page 5, lines 
23-25) 
This agrees with the Affidavit of Gordon E. Johnson and not 
with the subsequent Affidavit of Michael L. Miller and trial court 
findings. There is no mention of an employment contract 
supposedly mailed and not signed or unreasonable conduct by 
defendant. 
MQ - Did you have a contract with him to 
receive a contingency fee of some sort? 
(Emphasis Added) 
A - Yes I did. 
Q - And was that entire transaction and the 
contract we just mentioned, the basis of the 
lawsuit which you filed? 
A - Yes." (Page 6, lines 5-10) 
Actually his lawsuit was filed and default judgement taken 
before the settlement. 
The case law is clear in Utah that when there is an express 
contract, the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover the reasonable 
value of his services. 
"Recovery in Quasi Contract is not available 
where there is an express contract covering 
the subject matter of litigation." Mann v. 
American Western Life Insurance Company, 5 8 6 
p.2d 462 (Utah, 1978) . 
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Further^ recovery in quantum meruit requires that it be clear 
from the facts that both parties intend that the suing party be 
paid. The Rule is stated in Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank and 
Trust Company. 561 p.2d 683 (Utah 1977) as follows: 
"To find an implied promise warranting 
recovery of a theory of quantum meruit for 
services rendered or benefits conferred all of 
the facts must be examined to determine the 
intention of both parties, as to whether pay 
was expected by the renderer and to be paid by 
the recipient." (emphasis added) 
Clearly, the Defendant did not expect to have to pay Mr. 
Miller after his withdrawal necessitated hiring new counsel. The 
California case of Moore v. Fellner, 318 p.2d 526, which dealt 
with a suit for attorney's fees by an attorney who did not 
complete his representation, reasoned as follows: 
"The question is whether an attorney who 
undertakes to render an entire service may 
quit when an important part of the work 
remains undone and deserve to be paid for 
partial performance. As well as might a 
surgeon claim compensation when he quit in the 
middle of an operation, or a barber when he 
had shaved half of a customer's face. The 
answer is that there is no concept of law or 
fair dealing that permits one contracting 
party to repudiate his obligation to render 
personal service and hold another party to his 
reciprocal obligations under the contract 
(p. 531)." 
Mr. Miller did not have the right to condition his further 
performance of the contract on Defendant's acceptance of a 
settlement offer which he felt to be inadequate. Mr. Miller 
clearly breached his contract of representation and is therefore 
not entitled to recover any compensation. 
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Defendant Johnson had a right for his personal injury action 
to go to trial. Attorney Miller realized he had a difficult 
client but did not provide for exigencies of employment prior to 
resolution of the lawsuit in any written agreement. Phillips vs. 
Smith (198 9) 100 Utah Adv. Rptr. 3. 
In the case at bar, the facts are much more favorable to the 
Defendant: There was no written fee agreement, although the Rules 
of Ethics require it^ counsel in the case at bar withdrew when the 
litigant failed to accept the offer he proposed, rather than being 
discharged; and subsequent counsel obtained a more favorable 
settlement for the litigant. All of these facts favor the 
Defendant in the case at bar. 
The Phillips case suggests that Mr. Miller may have a cause 
of action against attorney Dyer, who directly benefitted from his 
work on the case, in quantum meruit, but not against the 
defendant. 
Ill 
By not agreeing to binding arbitration attorney Miller 
acknowledged his action was meritless. His conduct was malicious 
in taking a default judgement when there was an "appropriate 
responsive pleading" on file. See the Order 88032(t-CA on file and 
Declarations of Costs on Appeal which he should pay. Also, 
attorney Mayorga should be paid for her time and defendant for his 
per U.C.A. 78-27-56. 
In the file is a copy of a letter by Lynn Q. Beard, M.D. to 
attorney Miller outlining defendants health problems. Punitive 
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damages are justified for the harassment and frustration of 
procedural technicalities while ill, including arrest and six days 
in jail. 
There is no cover letter or follow-up letter for an 
employment agreement supposedly mailed and not signed. 
This is an egregious example of an action not "well grounded 
in fact or law" per Rule 11, particularly after the fee 
arbitration ruling. Sanctions are appropriate. Apparently, Mr. 
Miller didn't want the risk of proceeding to trial and winning 
one-third of nothing. 
CONCLUSION 
When there is a contingency agreement; quitting and suing for 
one-third of an offer, is a meritless action. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this suit under the 
law, and he should be required to return the $500.00 cost 
retainer, pay defendant's reasonable attorney fees and punitive 
damages; and costs of the prior appeal, underlying lawsuit, and 
this appeal. 
Dated September £~ , 198 9 at Brigham City, Utah 
Respectfully Submitted 
Gordon E.Jormson 
Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Complainant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I hereby certify or declare under penalty of perjury that on 
the following date I mailed four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Appellant!s Opening Brief to Michael L. Miller, Attorney At Law, 
20 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
Dated September , 198 9 
Gordon E. Johnson 
10 
BEAR RIVER COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER 
November 27, 1985 
To Whom I t May Concern: 
Gordon J o h n s o n i s u n d e r my c a r e and s u f f e r s from 
e m o t i o n a l p r o b l e m s . He i s n o t a b l e t o a t t e n d a 
summons in Davis C o u n t y ; however , he cou ld a t t e n d one 
scheduled in Box Elder County. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Yh^Xji* 
Meredith Alden/ M.D. 
AUO 
MA/jm 
750 West Second North 
P.O. Box 683 
Logan. Utah 84321 
(801) 752-0750 
1050 South 500 West 
Brigham City. Utah 84302 
(801) 734-9449 
William F. Bannon, 36 98 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
nfeefcivED 
APR 07 1986 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON £. JOHNSON and 
VERNA K. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, , 
vs. 
DAVID R. BUSH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No: 1-37320 
' Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs1 complaint, 
having been called up regularly for hearing on the 1st day of 
April, 1986, and plaintiffs appearing by and through their 
attorney of record, Michael L. Miller, and defendant appearing 
by and through his attorney of record, William F. Bannon, and 
the parties having represented to the court that they had reached 
an agreement and entered a stipulation on record that defendant's 
motion to dismiss may be dismissed, and that defendant shall have 
an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $100.00 and costs 
in the amount of $12.00 for traveling to Brigham City to take 
the plaintiffs' depositions with said award contingent upon 
defendant's counsel actually traveling to Brigham City for said 
depositions, and other good cause appearing, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's motion to dismiss be and hereby is dismissed and 
defendant is awarded $100.00 in attorney's fees and $12.00 in 
costs against the plaintiffs, contingent upon the defendant's 
counsel traveling to Brigham City to take the plaintiffs1 
depositions. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of April, 1986 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Michael L. Miller, Esq, 
29 South Main Street 
P.O. Box U 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Michael L. Mi l ler 
Attorney at Law 
20 So Main 
P O Box 399 
Bnghom City, Ut 
84302 
(801)723-1784 
****
ffM 
!><>* 
MICHAEL L. MILLER 
.<r-*c Attorney for PlaintiM'^ggsS^
 { <r«-
Ax
"3 L q o * ° ; 
20 South Main S t r e e t W& "=^#-*'^V^#K^J
 nQ00*** - ^ ^ 
P.O. Box 39 9 I A ^ L I ^ O ^ 
Brigham C i t y , Utah 84J 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 723-11 
t#00^' 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON E. JOHNSON and 
VERNA K. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
DAVID R. BUSH, 
Defendant. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 1-37320 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
COMES NOW MICHAEL L. MILLER, attorney of record for the 
Plaintiffs abovenamed and does hereby withdraw as attorney for the 
Plaintiffs upon the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs 
have failed to cooperate with counsel,. 
The address of the Plaintiffs is 216 West 100 North, Brigham 
City, Utah 84302. 
DATED this /^ J/\ day of March, 1987 
Myfchael L. Miller/ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
•ys-
\~CC A^^v^V^VT^rX 
MICHAEL L. MILLER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
20 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 399 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tel. (801)723-1784 
rr& T 
March 3 1 , 1987 
Fee Arbitration Committee 
Utah State Bar Association 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Fee Arbitration Claim, Gordon E. Johnson 
Dear Committee Members, 
I am in receipt of the petition of Gordon E. Johnson for 
arbitration of a fee dispute. Please be advised that I have 
already filed civil suit against Mr. Johnson in the First Circuit 
Court. I prefer at this time to have the matter resolved in this 
fashion rather than through arbitration. I am herewith returning 
the agreement to arbitrate, unsigned. My understanding is that 
the committee will hear the case regardless of whether I agree to 
have it binding. For the purpose of your hearing I am enclosing a 
statement of the nature, amount and basis of my claim. If there 
is anything further that I can provide, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
^1~^7^ 
iael L. Miller 
Attorney at Law 
MLM/vt 
Enclosure: Agreement to Arbitrate 
Statement of claim 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
The undersigned being first duly sworn does depose and state 
upon his oath that: 
In approximately December of 1985, I received a phone call 
from Mr. Gordon E. Johnson in regard to representation in a civil 
matter pending in The Second District Court of Davis County. He 
indicated that he had been representing himself up to that point; 
but felt that he needed counsel to intercede in as much as he was 
facing dismissal of the matter for refusing to attend a 
deposition. I asked Mr. Johnson to send the documentation on the 
matter, including court pleadings and I would review the same. On 
December 4th I wrote Mr. Johnson a letter, a copy of which is 
attached. After receipt of the letter, Mr. Johnson called me and 
we spoke about the matter further. Mr. Johnson indicated that he 
would let me know if and when my representation was needed. On 
December 31st I received a letter from Mr. Johnson, a copy of 
which is attached. I responded to the letter with a letter dated 
January 10, 1986, a copy of which is attached. On February 4th I 
received a letter and a check from Mr. Johnson. A copy of the 
letter is attached. I did not ask for a $500.00 retainer, nor did 
Mr. Johnson ever sign the attorney retainer agreement. My reason 
for claiming attorney's fees is not based on whether or not there 
was an agreement between Mr. Johnson and myself for a contingency 
fee. My reason is "that Mr. Johnson by his actions, caused me to 
withdraw as his attorney, thereby depriving me of my opportunity 
to collect a contingent fee. My claim is that because of Mr. 
Johnson's bad faith in pursuing the action for which I was 
retained, he breeched any agreement that existed between us. I 
also feel that Mr. Johnson has no intention of ever actively 
pursuing a resolution of the case. He has stalled the matter at 
every turn and has gained the benefit of my services in the 
process. My claim is that he has been unjustly enriched by the 
value of my services on his behalf; and that I deserve 
compensation for these services. The basis of my claim that he 
acted in bad faith is set forth in detail below. 
The basis of the case in the Second District Court was an 
auto accident in July of 1983. There is not an issue as to fault 
as the car in which Mr. Johnson was riding was rear ended. After 
taking the case I learned that Mr. Johnson had attempted to settle 
the matter through arbitration with his insurance company. When 
he was dissatisfied with the result, he filed suit against the 
driver. I also learned after the fact that Mr. Johnson was 
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originally represented by counsel. This attorney apparently 
withdrew after filing the initial pleadings and some discovery. 
I began investigating the matter to determine injuries, damages 
etc. Mr. Johnson was still trying to resist attending a 
deposition and I was attempting to establish a medical basis for 
his claim that he could not attend. I have included a number of 
documents which establish the events at this time in the 
proceeding and my efforts on his behalf. I was eventually able to 
avoid dismissal of the action. I also reviewed all of the medical 
evidence provided. I could find no basis for the injuries that 
Mr. Johnson was claiming. The only injury which could be 
documented was a broken ribr with a resultant arthrosis at the 
point of the break. All of the doctors statements indicate that 
this is the only injury and that it did not, nor does pose a 
significant problem to Mr. Johnson. The medical bills I could 
attribute to this injury were negligible, between $100.00 and 
$200.00. I have included copies of the doctors1 reports. I 
informed Mr. Johnson of what the evidence showed as to injuries 
and damages and he repeatedly insisted that he would get me the 
evidence that he had injuries which were much more serious than 
the broken rib and the tied these injuries to his medical bills. 
My request to him was made several times, and each time he said he 
would get me the information. Each time a report came, it 
confirmed only the broken rib and nothing further. I have 
attached copies of the correspondence in this time period. In 
addition, I spoke with Mr. Johnson on the phone several times. On 
each occasion I attempted to explain to him my position that he 
could not justify his claims based on the evidence that I had 
seen. I attempted to get him to focus on the injury to his rib 
and to forget about the other phantom injuries he kept insisting 
he could prove. I also attempted to get him to tell me what he 
wanted in the way of a settlement. He stated that no amount would 
be enough to compensate him. 
Mr. Johnson placed me in the position where I had to withdraw as 
his attorney. I could not in good conscious, nor as a practical 
concern for my credibility, continue to represent him in attempts 
to gain damages for injuries that he did not suffer as a result of 
the accident. I could not represent him in a bad faith or 
spurious claim. I also could not dissuade Mr. Johnson to accept 
the fact that only injury was the broken rib. I finally set a 
deadline, after which I would withdraw if one of three things did 
not happen, first I gave him one last chance to document his 
claims, second he could accept an offer of $5,000.00 as 
settlement, or third he could make a counteroffer based on the 
injury to his rib. I called Mr. Johnson to get his decision and 
he said he would get back to me. When he did not get back to me, 
I called again, he informed me that he was arranging for another 
attorney to take over the case and asked me to wait for the 
substitution of counsel. I told him I would not and that I would 
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have to withdraw. I then spoke to the office of the bar counsel 
concerning whether or not I could bill him for my time. I was 
informed that I could if I spent the time and felt as I did that 
he had forced me to withdraw. I then sent him a bill for the time 
I could document spending on the case. Attached is a copy of this 
list. 
In closing let me say that I sincerely wanted to help Mr. Johnson 
recover for what I believed were legitimate injuries. I became 
aware of his emotional problems and despite of this I attempted to 
represent his interests to the best of my ability. When it became 
clear that he was not going to abandon his claim to. unjustifiable 
injuries I felt compelled by my professional responsibilities to 
withdraw. I believe that I was correct in this decision. Despite 
of Mr. Johnson's emotional problems, I believe that he has 
knowingly decided to continue a meritless claim and that his 
failure to pursue this matter in good faith has been with a clear 
understanding of what he was doing. He should not be allowed to 
continue this practice, and for this reason I have chosen to file 
suit to collect what I believe is my due. To not do so would 
be in my mind an injustice to me and to the system. 
DATED this /$*£ day of $/),-, / f 1987. 
ft^^^^yJ,f 
iel L. Mill4r 
Subscribed before me this / - day of [}J/)AJJ' , 1987. 
Notary Public 
residing.^^JQ^nA^n O ^ U j ^ 
my commission expires ( \xJul . ; I I/O 
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BEFORE THE 
FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE 
UTAH STATE BAR 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
vs . 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, ESQ, 
NOTICE OF DECISION 
The Petition of Gordon E. Johnson in the matter of his 
legal fee dispute with Michael L. Miller, came on regularly for 
hearing on Monday, July 21, 1987 at 5:30 p.m., at the offices 
of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, City Centre I, 9th Floor, 175 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the undersigned, 
comprising one of the Board of Arbitrators of the Fee 
Arbitration Committee of the Utah State Bar. 
The parries having received Notice by certified mail 
not less than seven (7) days before the hearing submitting 
written response and electing not to appear at the hearing. 
The Committee having carefully considered the 
petitions, having reviewed and considered the documents and 
responses of the parties, finds as follows: 
1. Gordon E. Johnson retained Michael Miller under a 
contingent fee arrangement to represent him in a personal 
injury matter. 
2. In February 1986, Mr. Johnson sent to Mr. Miller 
a check for $500.00 as an advance against any contingent fee 
earned. 
3. Mr. Miller accepted the check and continued to 
represent Mr. Johnson under the contingent fee arrangement. 
4. It appears through a review of the documentation 
that the retainer agreement between the parties did not change 
during Mr. Miller's representation of Mr. Johnson and that the 
matter involving Mr. Johnson's injury was not settled or 
resolved through trial. 
5. Pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement, 
except for reimbursement of costs and expenses, Mr. Miller 
would only receive payment upon a favorable ruling or 
settlement of this matter. 
6. Based upon the foregoing it is the decision of 
the undersigned that the contingent fee arrangement in which 
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Miller based their attorney-client 
relationship restrained Mr. Miller from applying the $500.00 to 
any charges except out of pocket costs and expenses. 
7. The Committee therefore awards Mr. Johnson the 
sum of $500.00 less any sums which represent out of pocket 
costs or expenses expended by Mr. Miller in this matter. 
DATED this 2^sfkday of$2ly, 1987. 
cA riJ. [ \J' 
The-Honorable Scott Daniels 
Byr'in B. Barkley / 
0311n 
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Gordon jii. Johnson C'~,\ 1 6 I^H 
|2I6 West 1st North 
Brigham c i ty , Moan 84302 'MMMMM^  ,- , ; p p - , , .
 c 
' l e i . 501 723-3o77 ." r-'"~--J 
La Propria Peraona 
Us7 'fjtiii UTAH COURT 0? APPEALS 
MICJIASL L. MILLfil, 
Plaintiff/Crobs-rei'si-.-da.it/rltisponaerit, ) 
VD. ) 
GORDON Z. J0HNSOP, ) 
Def 3ndant/CroS3-Cou;d.air-a~t/ appel lant . ) 
Mo. 9004-u9-CA 
OUDDxeuientaj. .rjrief 
Credibility can be mutated *uth consistency, una Attorney Miller testified 
of three amounts o£ tne settlement offer ne received for plaintiff in tne under-
lyin,: case, i7,500 in an affidavit tc tne trial court, ;>M,300 in btate Of Utan 
|vs. Jonnson ||I took it to the point mere tney road rcaas an offer of settlement, 
ana withdrew at that point, and then ne accepted tne offer of set-
tlement after L withdrew. 
Q. Okay, In the same amount? 
A. Mes." 
.Vna :Ti3,0C0 in his affidavit to the Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration ConEittae. 
It is interestinp to note that Mr. Miller did not mention Attorney Phillip 
lh. Dyer wno obtained the settlement oi'fer after Mr. Miller nad witndrawn. Thus, 
fit appeared to Jud,-;e Parley R. Baldwin that Mr. Miller was caeatod out of a fee. 
There was no Pee Agreement tendered that appellant refused to si.ni,ana tne 
(only reason Mir. Miller withdrew is because appellant, plaintiff in the underlyin 
action, refused a $5,000 settlement proposed by Mr. Mailer. Please see nis 
March 3, 1937 letter in the file."in which he threatens to quit unless tne offer 
is accepted. 
Appellant aade a notion to nave nis cross-complaint transferred to District 
Cgort after ho was legally harassed, did six days in jail,nad about ^2,000 of 
expenses as a result of lir. Miller surreptitiously taking a default juagaasat. 
The trial court could have ruled on this motion as it aid not allege mali-
cious prosecution hut an abuse of process, i«e. kr# filler takin:; a default 
judgment while there was an "appropriate responsive" pleading on file. See the 
opinion in 8800324.-CA. 
Restatement, Torts ;/682 (193S) reads: "One who uses legal process whether 
civil or criminal, against another to accomplish a purpose for wnicn it is not 
intended is liable to the other ior the pecuniary loss caused thereby*" Also, see 
Comment 2 thereunder ana Declaration of Costs on Appeal wiiien is attributable to 
said Abuse of Process* It wasnft necessary to wait for the conclusion of the 
trial, 
Lated October 13* 1990 at Bri^ham City, Jtah 
Respectfully Submitted 
Goraon i« Jonnson 
Proof Of Ser/ice By Mail 
I hereby certify or declare under penalty of perjury tnat on October 13> 1990 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael L. Miller, Attorney At Law, 20 South 
Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84-302 
